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Preaching to the converted? How political
comedy matters
DOI 10.1515/humor-2015-0046
Abstract: Practitioners, audiences and critics are often dismissive of political
comedy’s impact. It is argued that audiences only attend political performances
if they already agree with the performer; further, that audiences will not laugh at
ideas that they find too subversive. As laughter depends upon consensus and
success depends upon laughter, the comedian merely preaches to the converted.
This article challenges these assumptions by examining the diverse strategies of
two political comedians: Mark Thomas and Stewart Lee. Through analysis of
performance, and their methodology and intent as related in practitioner inter-
views, I demonstrate that the nature of consensus in political comedy is more
complex than has generally been supposed. Far from being a sign of comedy’s
impuissance, consensus is used as a tool to enhance and develop political
engagement. I suggest that in order to discover whether political comedy mat-
ters, we must first broaden our understanding of how it matters.
Keywords: stand-up comedy, consensus, impact, Mark Thomas, Stewart Lee
1 Introduction
On the night of 19 March 2003, comedian Mark Thomas performed a gig in
Edinburgh. Before the morning, the American military would have commenced
air strikes on Baghdad, taking both Britain and America into an acutely con-
troversial war with Iraq. Both Thomas and his audience were aware that war was
imminent. For a high-profile peace campaigner and political activist, this was a
critical moment to be performing.
The significance of this event is demonstrated by the decision to record the
show and release it on CD (Thomas 2004), with the dramatic title Mark Thomas:
The Night War Broke Out (TNWBO). Thomas was aware of the drama and
significance that this event would draw from its timing. The show starts with a
segment of The Clash’s Rock the Casbah, played as intro music. Thomas begins
by apologizing for “the scares”; rumors that he had been arrested earlier that
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day and the show was cancelled (what was true was that he and some collea-
gues had been removed from the Scottish Parliament for causing a disturbance,
including showering its members with anti-war confetti). This hints that the
show is a little bit dangerous; there would be good reason for some authority to
prevent Thomas from performing on such a night. Thomas goes on to comment
on the structure of the show and ask if there are “any students in”, getting a
respectable laugh as he quips, “oh just, sort of, about three or four, really.
Which is good, ’cause that’s concessions, which is less money.”
The response becomes really explosive at the following gag (in this and all
transcriptions of performance, square brackets denote audience response).
Thomas asks, “just out of interest, have we got any French people in?” A quiet
“yeah” is audible on the recording. Thomas responds: “Fucking love you!
[Laughter followed by cheering, applause and whistles] … Fucking love you.
You are fucking gorgeous … French people are sophisticated and classy and
classic and the word ‘veto’ [laugh].” This is the first direct reference made to the
war. France had flexed its right to veto a United Nations resolution that would
give Iraq an ultimatum beyond which war would be automatic; thus the French
had come to be seen as allies by peace protestors. Americans, by contrast, get a
rougher deal: “Any Americans in, at all? [silence, followed by slightly nervous
laughter]. Are you sure? [laugh] They've learned, haven’t they? [laugh].”
Clearly, this is a case of preaching to the converted. Despite a national
climate of controversy, the audience in this gig is unified. They respond
instantly and emphatically to support anti-war activities, demonstrating pre-
existing allegiances. The question is: what does Thomas’ act of preaching to
the converted actually achieve, if anything?
In an interview published in 1994, fellow comedian Stewart Lee critiqued
Mark Thomas in the following terms:
I said [to Thomas] …“if you’re doing political stuff, and you’re concerned about it, as you are,
there’s not really that much point in doing most of the gigs you do, because all the people
there agree with you anyway. If you’ve really got something to say, you should take it out to
the prostitutes and tax gatherers and see what they think of it, and see if you can use your
comedy skills to win them round.” (Cook 1994: 225)
Lee’s comment embodies a common criticism of political comedy, and of poli-
tical art in general: that it achieves little because the audience who chooses to
access it already agrees with its message. Lee frames this as a problem for
political art. He assumes that the way to make a difference is to take the message
to those who do not already agree; or, to look at it in another way, to expound
ideas that audiences will find challenging and unfamiliar, rather than those with
which they are already comfortable.
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Mark Thomas and Stewart Lee both began performing in the 1980s. In
addition to their live performance work, each has achieved a high profile
through successful radio and TV series spread across the last three decades
(most recent examples include five series of Mark Thomas: The Manifesto [BBC
Radio 4 2009–2013] and three series of Stewart Lee’s Comedy Vehicle [BBC Two,
2009–2014]). Their careers have stretched beyond comic performance, with both,
for example, authoring books and serving as press journalists and columnists.
Both are described as political comedians, and both have been accused of
preaching to the converted. Both theorize their work in ways that seem to refute
the basic assumptions of such a phrase, seeing their comedy as a means to
engage audiences in empowering processes. Their tactics, however, are very
different. Lee has developed a distinctive performance style that purposefully
disrupts clear-cut interpretations and unanimity of audience response. Thomas,
meanwhile, makes a virtue of preaching to the converted. This article examines
these two very different approaches, arguing that political comedy matters, and
that it matters in diverse and complex ways.
2 Discord and consensus: The problem
of laughter
Notions akin to the accusation of preaching to the converted can be detected
running through comic theory. On the one hand, the literature points to joking’s
important role as a means of disrupting or challenging dominant norms and
power structures. On the other, joking is seen as a way of reinforcing group
consensus: it takes place among an in-group as a means to assert the group’s
sense of community and affirm norms.
Theories seeking to explain why things are funny are commonly divided into
three strands: superiority, relief and incongruity. Superiority theories cite defects
found in others as the source of funniness. While there are many finely nuanced
expressions of this idea, the basic premise is that laughter celebrates the laugh-
ers’ comparative excellence. Hobbes (1987: 19) theorized joking as the “appre-
hension of some deformed thing in another” and “observing the imperfections of
other men.” Long before, Cicero (1987: 17) had identified that “the seat and
province of the laughable … lies in a kind of offensiveness and deformity.” This
is to say that the butt of the joke is guilty of impropriety: superiority theories
imply that joking reinforces dominant norms and values by punishing those who
do not conform. Beyond the superiority strand, the notion that joking relies
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upon a shared understanding of ‘normal’ is often explicitly highlighted as a
fundamental element of joking. As Critchley (2002: 4) states, “in listening to a
joke, I am presupposing a social world that is shared, the forms of which the
practice of joke-telling is going to play with.”
Relief theories tend more towards the interpretation of joking as a disruptive
practice. In his influential Jokes and their relation to the unconscious, Freud
(1960) said that jokes were a means of temporarily eliding civilizing influences
to express hostile, unpleasant or otherwise seditious ideas. Herbert Spencer
(1911: 298–305) thought that laughter constituted the release of excess nervous
energy through “odd movements” of the body, namely the “half-convulsive
actions we call laughter.” At root, then, relief theories signify the subversion
of normal activity – whether physical, emotional or cognitive – or of decent
thoughts and behaviors. Like the superiority theories mentioned above, this
implies a shared sense of what is ‘normal’; the difference is that relief theories
cite the subversion of these norms – rather than their reinforcement – as the
source of funniness.
It is in incongruity theories that we see the most sophisticated expression of
joking as a means of disruption. In these theories, the joke is created by a clash
of incongruous ideas. Schopenhauer (1987: 62) expressed this notion in terms
that begin to lend themselves to politicization, suggesting that, at its best:
[H]umour depends upon a subjective, yet serious and sublime mood, which is involuntarily in
conflict with a common external world very different from itself, which it cannot escape from
and to which it will not give itself up; therefore … it tries to think its own point of view and
that external world through the same conceptions, and thus a double incongruity arises,
sometimes on the one side, sometimes on the other, between these concepts and the realities
thought through them. Hence … the joke, is produced, behind which, however, the deepest
seriousness is concealed and shines through.
In these instances, joking is an expression of discord. The joke “will not give
itself up” to the norm. Hence it is an expression of rebellion, however smiling.
Lash (1948: 119–120) also sees joking as a practice that destabilizes the norm
by suggesting alternatives:
Where the failure of the object to fit its archetype is intentional, as in the case of wit turning a
value upside-down, the incongruity is presented for the purpose of edification through the
agency of the imagination. A new norm, to supplant or to modify the original, is suggested; a
new point of view is invited … For any given situation, there exists a myriad of possible norms
ranging in degree all the way from that traditionally posited to its opposite … To select one of
a given number of related norms, though it may seem truest or best, is to exclude others …
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In Lash’s (1948: 120) philosophy, wit leads us to a “keener perception of the
actual” by reminding us that our norms are selective and constructed; however
natural our standards of normality may seem, alternatives do exist. The political
significance of this is more precisely articulated by Mary Douglas (1999: 150),
who defines joking as “the juxtaposition of a control against that which is
controlled, this juxtaposition being such that the latter triumphs.” She concurs
with Lash’s notion that incongruities allow alternative norms to be mooted, and
asserts that in doing so, “[t]he joke … affords opportunity for realising that an
accepted pattern has no necessity. Its excitement lies in the suggestion that any
particular ordering of experience may be arbitrary and subjective” (Douglas
1999: 152). Indeed, Douglas (1999: 152) offers a strong statement of joking’s
function as a disruptive social force: “[w]hatever the joke, however remote its
subject, the telling of it is potentially subversive … a dominant pattern of
relations is challenged by another.”
There is, however, an important caveat to the idea of joking as disruption: that it
is limited by the boundaries of consensus. Critchley (2002: 11) allows that joking, at
its best, can challenge power and “expose its contingency,” such that “we realise that
what appeared to be fixed and oppressive is in fact the emperor’s new clothes.”
However, such instances are in the minority: “[m]ost humour, in particular the
comedy of recognition – and most humour is comedy of recognition – simply
seeks to reinforce consensus and in no way seeks to criticise the established order
or change the situation in which we find ourselves.” Although Mary Douglas (1999:
152) saw joking as essentially disruptive, and argued that every joke was “potentially
subversive,” this disruptive power is always limited by the consensus of its audience:
[T]here are jokes which can be perceived clearly enough by all present but which are rejected
at once … Social requirements may judge a joke to be in bad taste, risky, too near the bone,
improper or irrelevant. Such controls are exerted either on behalf of the hierarchy as such, or
on behalf of values which are judged too precious and precarious to be exposed to challenge.
For Douglas (1999: 155–159), a joke must carry an “element of challenge,” but
the joker’s “disruptive comments … are in a sense the comments of the social
group upon itself.” Douglas (1999: 159) arrives at the conclusion that the joker
“merely expresses consensus.”
Both Critchley and Douglas choose rather loaded adverbs, respectively describ-
ing jokes as “simply” and “merely” dealing in consensus. Such choices embody the
same assumptions as accusations of preaching to the converted in political art,
implying that to express the group’s consensus is an act of little or no political
significance. In comic performance, though, consensus has particular power because
it is demonstrated through laugher.
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As Limon (2000: 12) so emphatically states: “your laughter is the single end
of stand-up.” Double (2007: 13) elaborates:
Stand-up comedy is like a conversation in which the audience makes a contribution that is as
limited as it is vital. Normally, they stick to a very narrow set of responses (laughter,
applause, heckling, etc.), but these are absolutely crucial to the comedian. The sounds the
audience make are part of the rhythm of the act, providing the energy which fuels the
performance. They are also an important indicator of success or failure. An appalled silence
at the end of a joke gives a clear message.
Audience responses can be subtle, and “comics become very skilled at reading
them,” discerning the different messages audiences are giving (Double 2007: 13).
Audiences also listen to one another, and are competent in interpreting group
response. As Carr and Greeves (2007: 181) note:
When jokes are told in public, people edit their responses unconsciously and continuously. All
of us are much more likely to laugh out loud when we're part of a group rather than when
we're alone – we are signaling that we get it, that we are part of a group with a shared sense
of humour. Equally, we understand, even if only subliminally, that when and how we laugh
can give something away. In judging whether we should take offence at a joke, we apply a
complex set of measurements of which we’re usually only partially aware … we look around
at the other listeners, to see whether they are laughing and whether we’re allowed to laugh in
their company.
Although they may not be entirely cognizant of it, the audience of a stand-up gig
know that they are engaged in something more complex than free, individual
and organic responses; as Zijderveld (1968: 295) observes, “the joking situation
is not as ‘natural’, or ‘spontaneous’ as one might think, since it is closely related
to the values dominant in a particular society.”
Laughter is an expression of inclusion and conformity. As Bergson (2008: 11)
states, “[y]ou would hardly appreciate the comic if you felt yourself isolated
from others. Laughter appears to stand in need of an echo … Our laughter is
always the laughter of a group.” According to Lorenz (1967: 253), laughter can be
a mechanism for “produc[ing], simultaneously, a strong fellow-feeling among
participants and joint aggressiveness against outsiders. Heartily laughing
together at the same thing forms an immediate bond … and simultaneously
draws a line.” Laughter exerts a social pressure to conform: a straight choice
between joining in with the fun and cosy group activity, and finding oneself
isolated. In a comedy gig, the audience is performing, responding to substantial
pressure to vocalize a response that is in keeping with the group reaction.
For all its promise as a disruptive and challenging social practice, this backs
political comedy into rather a bleak corner. The joker is bound by the consensus
of the group; it logically follows, therefore, that political comedians can only
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hope to attract audiences who already agree with them, at least if they want that
audience to laugh. Worse still, our knowledge of the social pressure to conform
with group laughter could suggest that audience members can be coerced into
mob-like behaviour, causing them to celebrate or conform with ideas that are
not their own. Freud (1960: 103) noted “the joke will evade restrictions and open
sources of pleasure that have become inaccessible. It will further bribe the hearer
with its yield of pleasure into taking sides without any very close investigation.”
[original emphasis]
This is notmerely a theoretical concern; somepractitioners are also uneasy about
thepotential for laughter tobecomea ‘mob’ response.Wenowmoveon to explore two
different responses to these fundamental issues: the anti-mob policy of Stewart Lee,
who embraces discord, and the consensus-mongering tactics of Mark Thomas.
3 Courting discord: Stewart Lee and the comedy
of disruption
Stewart Lee (2009) describes his unusual methodology, saying: “the most
obvious thing to do in stand-up is to try and get everyone on side, but I like
to create a feeling of confusion in the room where people don’t really know if
they’re supposed to be laughing or not.” What is unusual about this
approach is that it eschews the demands of consensus. Rather than “getting
everyone on side,” Lee often denies the audience this sense of group har-
mony, creating a peculiarly discordant response.
Performing in Glasgow, Lee (2010) delivered a controversial routine which
was ostensibly about presenters of the BBC program Top Gear – namely Jeremy
Clarkson, James May and Richard Hammond – but is perhaps more helpfully
understood as a political piece about ‘soft’ bigotry in mainstream entertain-
ment. The BBC is funded by television license fees that are compulsory for all
British homes where live television is watched or recorded, subject to some
exemptions. Top Gear is a highly popular program on the network about cars
and driving. Clarkson, May, and Hammond remained the show’s presenters
until March 2015, when, following several scandals around political incorrect-
ness, Clarkson was finally fired for punching a producer. May and Hammond
left soon after. Lee’s routine begins by saying that he hates Top Gear, which
gets a modest laugh and one cheer from a single audience member. Lee
comments on this response, triggering a few more people to cheer and
applaud. Lee then gestures to a small area of the audience on his right:
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There’s a little pocket, isn’t there, spread across here and here and here, of, like, the liberal
Top Gear haters [laugh] but on the whole, here, tonight in Glasgow, probably the majority of
the audience are going “well we like Top Gear. It’s funny, what’s your” [laugh] – “why?” – the
problem is I hate Top Gear [laugh]. And I hate anyone that likes it, [laugh] right. And I’m
now, I’m gonna explain why that is for about forty-five minutes [laugh followed by applause].
This introduction breaks with convention. Where a comedian might normally try
to establish a shared attitude toward the subject of a routine, Lee instead
stresses diversity of opinion. This denies the establishment of consensus and
highlights discord on several levels: Lee claims that the audience are not in
agreement with each other, that most of them do not agree with him, and even
implies that this Glasgow audience’s response is unique. Lee then introduces a
notion on which it should be easy for his audience to find consensus:
The reason I hate Top Gear – and even if you’re a Top Gear viewer, like most of you are, you
have to relate to this – the reason I hate Top Gear, is ’cause it is willfully and deliberately
politically incorrect … I like political correctness, I think it’s good, so I can’t relate to Top
Gear. But I don’t think it’s aimed at me [laugh] right? It’s aimed at a different kind of middle-
aged man, isn’t it, a kind of frightened [small laugh] middle-aged man, in his house, he’s
scared of how the world’s changing, and political correctness has gone mad, and he likes to
watch Top Gear – don’t you, cause it pays [laugh] pays no heed to the political correctness …
On the words “don’t you,” Lee addresses the audience to his left, implying that
they are representative of the “frightened middle aged man” who likes Top Gear,
and thus emphasizing the imagined division between different factions of his
audience.
Lee’s comments here should embody easy points of consensus for the leftist,
liberal audience who are likely to attend his show. This audience can be
expected to value and adhere to the standards of political correctness that
characterize alternative comedy. When Lee identifies a knot of the frightened-
middle-aged-man type to his left, the audience laugh because they know it is a
prank: clearly, none of Lee’s audience would wish to be described as reactionary
bigots. Lee should indeed be preaching to the converted in this context.
However, Lee goes on to utterly disrupt this consensus. He swerves into a
personal attack on Richard Hammond, making specific reference to a real, life-
threatening car accident in which Hammond was involved during filming for
Top Gear. Lee calls Hammond “a man who’s been able to carve out a best selling
literary career off the back of his own inability to drive safely”; a reference to
Hammond’s subsequent best-selling book. Lee jokes that Hammond should have
published with the publicly-funded BBC because, “you and me – the license
payers – we funded that crash … and therefore we are entitled to feel the benefit
of any profits derived from it.” Lee does not deliver his gags with a wry smile,
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but as if they were intended as serious commentary, leaving it to the audience to
spot and apply the irony inherent in the routine. This enhances the feeling that
consensus is lacking; their response seems at odds with Lee’s demeanor.
Finally, Lee comes to a bold statement:
I think [writing a book about the crash is] a cynical thing to do, and I hate him for it, and I
wish he’d been killed in that crash [big laugh and some applause]. I do. I wish he’d been
killed [small laugh] and, er, and decapitated [small laugh] and that the next series of Top
Gear had been presented by Jeremy Clarkson, James May and Richard Hammond’s severed
head on a stick [laugh].
Lee takes the microphone away from his mouth, letting it hang by his side as he
moves downstage to look out over his audience, his face betraying no malice or
excitement. He continues: “And if that seems a bit much. For all the Top Gear
viewers. It's just a joke, like on Top Gear [big laugh, growing into applause with
some whoops].”
At this point, it appears that Lee is re-establishing consensus. He reveals
that his offensive comments about Hammond were all a ploy to expose the
inadequacy of a defense commonly made for the politically incorrect joking on
Top Gear: that “it’s just a joke.” However, Lee is not about to make it this easy
for his audience:
“It’s just a joke” – the Jeremy Clarkson defence – “it’s just a joke” [laugh]. So when I said
that I wished Richard Hammond had been decapitated and killed, right, like when they do
their jokes on Top Gear, it's just a joke [small laugh]. But coincidently [laugh] as well as it
being a joke [laugh] it’s also what I wish had happened [big laugh].
Wishing that a real person had been killed in a real car crash, takes the routine
back into hazardous territory.
Lee elaborates on his reasons for disliking Hammond, comparing the way he
laughs along with Clarkson’s bigotry to “a horrible little shit-weasel kid at
school, hanging around with all the bullies, laughing at their jokes, in
the hope they won’t pick on him.” He relates an example of this dynamic,
wherein Clarkson jokingly referred to former British Prime Minister Gordon
Brown as “a one-eyed Scottish idiot.” Lee takes issue with the decision to
mock Brown’s visual impairment, particularly drawing a moral basis for his
argument from the fact that Brown lost his sight in childhood. Lee imagines a
parent with a sick child in hospital, trying to reassure them:
But presumably, there came a point where Gordon Brown’s parents didn’t do that any more
because he was blind and that was that, and Jeremy Clarkson thinks that’s a funny thing to
do a joke about [small laugh]. Now, Jeremy Clarkson has three daughters, and I hope they all
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go blind [shocked laughter and some smattered applause] Not one of them in one eye, all of
them in all their eyes! [laugh continues] Come on, it’s just a joke like on Top Gear!
The audience response at this point is particularly fragmented. There is some
fairly unified laughter, a smattering of applause and a couple of isolated
whoops. The only audience members visible on camera are two men sitting
in a small patch of light in the front row. They are smiling – perhaps laughing –
but are not applauding; they look around and at the floor, seemingly trying
to discern what is the appropriate response in this situation. While Douglas’
(1999: 159) assertion that the joker “merely expresses consensus” could be
applied to many joking situations, it seems that Lee is employing the opposite
strategy here. In fantasizing about death and blindness befalling real, and
specified, people, Lee has chosen an approach to his topic with which he
knows his audience cannot possibly agree.
Offstage, Lee (2009) explains why he seeks discord rather than unified
laughter:
I don’t like consensus, really … I think when there’s loads of people laughing at the same
thing it just feels nasty, y’know, I like the idea that there’s some kind of exchange or process
going on … And there is something unpleasant about lots of people all laughing at the same
thing in the same way. It’s a bit like a rally, you know.
Lee also equates the audience who laugh uncritically and in unison with a
‘mob’, echoing Bill Hicks’ statement, “to me, the comic is the guy who says,
‘Wait a minute’ as the consensus forms … He’s the antithesis of the mob
mentality” (Lahr 1993).
This aversion to the mob mentality may stem from recognition of the
problem with laughter: it can bribe audiences to laugh for the sake of fun or
inclusion, rather than engaging critically with the ideas offered. Lee (2009)
himself states: “you sort of do feel obliged to take an opposition point of view
… You’re supposed to be the person asking uncomfortable questions, I think,
even if they’re about trivial things, rather than the person agreeing with every-
one. You shouldn’t be agreeing with everyone. You should be disagreeing with
them just for the sake of it.” Many political comedians espouse counter-cultural
or anti-establishment views for an audience of like-minded dissenters: this is
the method Mark Thomas employs in the example quoted above. What makes
Lee’s approach so distinctive is that he actively manufactures discord among his
audience within the gig.
This decision is at least partly artistic. Lee (2009) explains:
In somewhere like The Comedy Store or Jongleurs [two of the most famous comedy club
franchises in the United Kingdom] … there’ll be a guy talking about things, and the people in
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the audience nudge each other going, “that’s what you’re like”, “you say that”, “oh, I did
that!” Whereas what I like, is I like to be in an audience going “I would never have thought of
that!”, or “I would never have said that!”, or “why would you possibly think that?!” … I like to
be taken by surprise. So I think it just depends what people want.
As an artist, Lee (2009) enjoys the challenge inherent in his approach: “I do like
to do things that I think might not work … You kind of make things difficult for
yourself to keep yourself awake, really.”
There is, though, a political dimension to Lee’s preferences. His argument in
the above routine is that political correctness should be prized over cheap
bigotry sold through entertainment; surely there are many strategies he could
have employed to win his audience round easily to consensus with this point of
view, gaining easy and unified laughter. Interestingly, Lee has instead chosen to
make an easy ideological battle into a difficult one. The motivation for this is
both artistic and political. Lee (2009) elaborates; “part of the pleasure of any
piece of art (and I think stand-up is art), is having the fun of figuring it out for
yourself … I build that in quite self-consciously, giving the audience the pleasure
of figuring it out for themselves … and I like that, ‘cause it means they’re, sort of,
engaged.”
Lee’s political content is delivered not only through what is said, but also in
the form that his comedy takes. For him, the way in which audiences engage
with the material seems at least as important as the message conveyed.
Recognizing that it is not only about what audiences hear, but also how they
engage with it, is key to understanding the potential for impact in the more
straightforward case of preaching to the converted presented by Mark Thomas’
TNWBO.
4 Mark Thomas and the importance of preaching
to the converted
TNWBO has an explicit aim for political impact. Thomas (2004) encourages his
audience to participate in active protest against the war. He gives several
examples of potential actions, from invitations to attend protest demonstrations
to more imaginative bits of mischief-making. The anti-war campaign had
amassed the largest protest march that Britain had ever seen. Thomas has a
suggestion:
If you were on the demonstration today – [or if] you go tomorrow – the cops will go filming
ya, right? If you were on that demonstration in London – the big fucking Ministry of Defence
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people will have filmed every single fucking demonstrator. Under the Data Protection Act you
are entitled to claim your video image [laugh]. Write in [small laugh]. Write in: “Dear Police
Officer – Dear M.O.D. [Ministry of Defense] I was on the march. I do believe you were
filming.” [small laugh] “Under the Data Protection Act I would like to declare all the video
images of me. Here is a passport photograph, a copy of a recent utility bill – ah, proof of
where I live – and a cheque for ten pounds which you’re obliged to, er, to ask for but you
don’t necessarily have to cash in. I would like all video images of me. I do note that any video
images of other people included on the tape would be illegal and in breach of the Data
Protection Act” [laugh]. “Find me if you can” [laugh].
Thomas imagines a police officer sat in a room watching endless reams of
footage, then builds to a big laugh and applause as he says: “and if we all
fucking did it, it’d be fucking great! In fact, even if you’re not on the march,
fucking do it – that’s even more important! Every one of you, join in!”
Some of Thomas’ audience are already involved in action on some level. He
asks who went on the mass anti-war protest marches, and a smattering of applause
and cheering indicates that some of this Edinburgh audience did indeed travel to
London or Glasgow to participate. The majority of Thomas’ audience, though, seem
not to have gone on the march, and may be particularly averse to engaging in more
errant modes of direct action.
The show does much to make direct action seem more accessible to this
relatively moderate audience. Thomas acknowledges that he sometimes feels
nervous or overwhelmed. He relates the story of a protest in Whitehall, a London
street that houses many government offices, that “got a bit lively.” His friend
Martin, and a fellow activist called Gideon, have stopped a police van by leaning
against it. Thomas is chatting to them:
Suddenly everything changes because the cops charge from the other end of the street.
Everything changes: the noise, the feeling, the atmosphere. And in those moments, I head
for the side of the street, press myself against the wall and try and look like brick [laugh] …
And I saunter back, and Martin and Gideon are still there [small laugh]. ’Aven’t fuckin’
moved [small laugh]. Just in front of them there’s a pile of horse shit [small laugh] where one
of the cop things has gone past. I go “alright lads?”
Martin, performed by Thomas: Yep (grunt). Looks like you left something, Mark [laugh].
By including incidents in which he himself comes across as scared or inept,
Thomas makes the notion of activism more accessible to his audience. This
suggests that activists are ordinary people, and it is okay to be nervous and
uncertain. In fact, Thomas (2004) cites this as a potential strength: “that’s what
really gets them. They don’t like it when people go, ‘we are a little bit frightened,
and we haven’t done this before, but we are prepared to get nicked [arrested].’”
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Thomas also demystifies the processes by which direct action is perpetrated
and controlled. Several of Thomas’ stories involve protestors undertaking risky
activities but coming to no legal or actual harm. For example, Thomas’ story
about his friend Martin continues with a phone conversation that took place
while Martin was chained to a petrol pump:
I said, “What did the police do?”
He said, “Well the police came along and said, ‘Have you got any intention of breaking the
law?’, I said ‘No’” [laugh]. “They said, ‘well if you have no intention of breaking the law we’ll
leave you to it’” [laugh and applause].
I said, “You’re kidding”
He goes, “No. They said, ‘How long are you gonna be?’ I said, ‘About ten hours.’ They said, ‘If
you’re not gonna break the law, that’s fine’” [small laugh].
I said, “But – but”
He goes, “Yeah, I know, aggravated trespass. But they weren’t gonna say anything; I fucking
weren’t” [big laugh and applause].
These examples disrupt the traditional sources of authority that might prevent
moderate people from engaging in activism. The Police’s authority is dependent
upon their choosing to exercise it; the law is an ambiguous realm in which the
protestor’s creativity, or the sheer weight of numbers, often results in the protestor
escaping repercussions. This reflects Critchley’s (2002: 11) notion that “by laugh-
ing at power, we expose its contingency.” By laughing together at the Police’s
decision not to intervene, and applauding in celebration of Martin’s good luck, the
audience recognizes that there is a limit to conventional authority.
For Thomas (2008), this is an important part of the work:
It’s about activism, but it's also about something that exists outside the theatre. If it doesn’t
exist outside the theatre at the end of it, I’ve failed. Because actually all of this is about …
having an impact is an important thing, telling people that they can do it, actually, and you
can do it with fun is really important. And actually, I hope that that sense does go on.
It is important to Thomas that his audience is encouraged to take practical
action. Such impact is, of course, significant, but it is unlikely that every
member of Thomas’ audience goes on to engage in actual activism; indeed, it
may be the vast minority who do so. While Thomas clearly hopes to engage
audience members in some specific activities, he, like Lee, also hopes that his
work will engage people on a more fundamental level:
I was brought up in this culture … that actually art did influence people’s decisions, that
actually art could change people’s minds. But also it wasn’t just about that – it was about
someone actually being in the fucking moment, so that you’re part of the debate, you’re part
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of the argument, you’re part of the forces that are going on … So for me, art was always about
something … Art and culture was always – had a purpose to it, it had a point to it, it was
about engaging in something (Thomas 2008).
It is easy to assume that political comedians seek to cause specific, uni-
lateral and pre-determined changes in audience attitudes or behaviors. This
would amount to mere indoctrination, and ill accords with the way either
Thomas or Lee articulate their own intentions for their work. For Thomas, the
aim may be to use comedy to engage audiences in a debate, and even to
advocate particular political views and behaviors, but this should not be con-
fused with intent to indoctrinate. His aim, as stated here, is not to cause fixed
and unilateral changes in either attitude or behavior, but rather to engage
individuals in a more democratic societal process.
When asked about the impact of his work, Thomas can point to concrete
changes in various areas including law and the practices of big businesses, as
well as getting some audience members involved in protest. However, he also
relates his impact to a more subtle and pervasive line of public influence:
The whole point about this is that it should be fun, but it also should have a significance. If
you can’t play with these big ideas then, you know, what you’re saying is, is that some things
are sacred, and we can never change them. And as soon as you say that, it’s just like you’ve
just become part of the obstacle. You know, the whole point is it’s open to change … If we see
ourselves as part of a continuum of democracy that goes back to Chartism [a movement,
beginning c. 1837, that demanded rights and principles that later became fundamental
precepts of British democracy], or goes back to the public debates, then actually we’ve got
fucking masses of stuff that’s gone on … So, actually, if you look at it in those terms, masses
of change happens. Change occurs all the time. It's about whether you can shape or change,
and influence its direction (Thomas 2008).
This is arguably the key to understanding the real impact of Thomas’ stand-up
comedy performance. People are constantly acting and communicating, and
“change occurs all the time”; the challenge, surely, is to understand what
shapes these less dramatic, but more pervasive, activities.
One important thing that Thomas (2004) does on TNWBO is to re-tell the story
so far. The mainstream “propaganda”, to use Thomas’ term, has spun a narrative in
which the Iraqi government was holding dangerous weapons of mass destruction
and America and Britain were reluctantly stepping forward to save the world – and
the Iraqi people – from an aggressive and dangerous regime. As far as the narrative
of the anti-war movement is concerned, this moment could be seen as a tragic end
to the tale: all is lost, the war begins anyway.
Thomas systematically reinterprets these narratives, using some dense fac-
tual information to support his own version of the story. He argues that the
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impending war is better understood as a strategic maneuver designed to defend
America as an empire. As for the accusation that the anti-war movement has
achieved nothing, Thomas says, “we put ten years on that fucker and that’s
enough [laugh]. Ten years. Somewhere in Downing Street there’s a portrait
getting younger and that fucking suits me just fine [laughter and some clap-
ping]”, a reference to Oscar Wilde’s The picture of Dorian Gray, in which the
protagonist maintains his untouched, youthful beauty while his portrait ages
with his every act of debauchery. At the end of the show, Thomas summarizes
the collective dilemma: “and I’ll tell you what it’s about, for each and every one
of us. It’s about when we wake up in the morning, and we look at ourselves in
the bathroom mirror, can we live with what we see? Good luck and thanks for
coming.” The encore concludes, “thanks and keep going.” Whether or not his
audience goes on to perpetrate hardcore activism, he has successfully reframed
the narrative as one of continuing struggle. The invasion of Iraq is a critical plot
point, but it is not the end of the story: their struggle continues.
To implicate an audience in this narrative is a powerful thing. Walter
Lippmann (1922: 10–11) noted that “human culture is very largely the selection,
the rearrangement, the tracing of patterns upon, and the stylizing of” the
information we can glean from our environment; “for the real environment is
altogether too big, too complex, and too fleeting for direct acquaintance. We are
not equipped to deal with so much subtlety, so much variety, so many permuta-
tions and combinations. And although we have to act in that environment, we
have to reconstruct it on a simpler model before we can manage with it.”
Lippmann (1922: 10) identifies that the need to summarize information into a
more manageable form leads to the “insertion between man and his environ-
ment of a pseudo-environment”; the individual experiences the world not as it
is, but as he has constructed it, summarizing it into a manageable form. The
individual’s behavior is then a reaction to this pseudo-environment, “but
because it is behaviour, the consequences, if they are acts, operate not in the
pseudo-environment where the behaviour is stimulated, but in the real environ-
ment where action eventuates” (Lippmann, 1922: 10). Thus the patterns by which
people arrange their experience of the world have direct influence on their
behavior and the way they function in society.
Novitz relates this concept directly to the relationship between narrative and
politics. He argues that human behavior is shaped by the stories that individuals
tell about themselves, and thus “we can change people’s ideas about what
constitutes a normal, decent, or natural human being by bringing them to accept
and respect the stories we tell about ourselves … It is not just that we can change
one another’s ideas about what is natural in human behaviour, but that
in changing these ideas we can change our behaviour” (Novitz 2001: 155).
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Mayer (2014: 81) further argues that stories “can so frame an issue that acting
becomes an expression of identity and, indeed, a moral imperative”:
So, too, in social and political life, we can be pulled to act by the stories that engross us …
Caught up in story, pulled up onto the stage, we find that we must rescue the victim, must
fight for justice, must sacrifice for the cause, because our identity is at stake, because those
acts are what the plot demands of our character (Mayer, 2014: 98).
Human beings must constantly make decisions about how to act. It is commonly
accepted that we make these decisions by drawing on our understanding of the role
that we think others expect us to play: our notion of proper behavior. To do this, we
necessarily deploy simplified patterns. As Allport (1979: 8–9) notes, “life is so short,
and the demands upon us for practical adjustments so great, that we cannot let our
ignorance detain us in our daily transactions.We have to decidewhether objects are
good or bad by classes. We cannot weigh each object in the world by itself. Rough
and ready rubrics, however coarse and broad, have to suffice.” It is in contributing
to these “rough and ready rubrics” that Thomas makes his most pervasive impact.
The audience knows that Thomas is preaching to the converted. For them, this is
the point. Where this translates into impact is in the use of the audience as a peer
group; a mechanism by which the individual determines what interpretation of the
world is correct for people like them (Merton 1968: 335–440). By laughing, cheering
and applauding together, the faithful affirm and develop their own notions of propri-
ety. This may or may not translate into activism, but the evidence suggests that
affirming theirmembershipof this anti-war community, and coming together to verify
what this community collectively thinks and feels, is bound to affect the way these
individuals function in society. This may not be a dramatic way of understanding
efficacy; to covert non-believers or cause outright revolutionwoulddoubtless bemore
exciting. This impact is subtle, but this is not the same as being insignificant.
Twelve years later, speculation about the Iraq war continues. Many British
people still hold the view that the war was illegal; speculation that the then-
Prime Minister, Tony Blair, should face prosecution for war crimes is particularly
rife (even the current leader of Blair’s own party, Jeremy Corbyn, insists that the
war was illegal and has hinted that Blair could face prosecution [Watt 2015]).
The government has been pushed into some concrete action, setting up the
independent Chilcot Inquiry in 2009 to, “[consider] the UK’s involvement in Iraq,
including the way decisions were made and actions taken, to establish … what
happened and to identify the lessons that can be learned” (Iraq Inquiry, 2015).
Of course, Thomas was not the sole cause of these developments: it was along
with numerous other voices that shaped and encouraged the anti-war commu-
nity that he played his part in perpetuating their narrative. The war is long since
over, but the resistance to it fights on.
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5 How political comedy matters
Both Mark Thomas and Stewart Lee seek to engage their audiences in processes
of thought: to define, query or problematize mainstream notions of normal.
Their work illustrates that to say joking “merely” or “simply” expresses con-
sensus – and to see this as a practice that exists in binary opposition to
challenging, confronting and making a difference – is to oversimplify the social
function of comedy. Lee and Thomas both employ strategies that combine
consensus and disruption. Lee disrupts pre-existing consensus in order to
circumvent the passive compliance of the mob; Thomas uses consensus to
make his audience aware of their own role in on-going societal developments,
thus shaping and enabling participation in these processes.
Thomas and Lee have different aims and employ different strategies; other
comedians have yet more methods. Their work demonstrates that we must move
away from some simplistic notions: that comedy’s impact is to be found solely in
some pre-determined and measurable change to individual opinions and beha-
viors, and that to preach to the converted is a practice of no value. Comedy’s
efficacy may take a range of forms, and these assemblies of the faithful are the
best place for these to begin. This is how political comedy matters.
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